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Theme: The appreciation of the euro over the last two years –a trend likely to continue 
into the future, despite a recent slip from US$1.29 to US$1.21– is not only a positive 
development for the European economy but also a prerequisite for a sustained period of 
global growth. 
 
Summary: The world economy cannot recover and begin a renewed cycle of strong 
sustainable growth until the remaining international macroeconomic imbalances –legacies 
of the 1990s’ US-driven boom– have been unwound. Only dollar decline and European 
economic reform can hope to achieve the necessary adjustment. Europe would be well-
advised to take advantage of the new window of opportunity for cooperation to resolve the 
Stability and Growth Pact controversy and to forge ahead with the Lisbon Agenda. While 
many may be sceptical that this can be rapidly achieved in Europe, it nevertheless 
remains a better bet than passively expecting the corollary adjustments to be made in the 
US on fiscal policy or in Asia with respect to currency policy. In the end, if the European 
project is to deliver on much of its long-awaited promise, the EU must assume its new role 
as a critical engine of world economic growth. 
 
 
Analysis 
 
Economic Reform in Europe 
For a number of reasons the economic mood in most of Europe has been gloomy. First, 
the atmosphere within the European Union (EU) has been particularly acrimonious ever 
since the controversy surrounding the Stability and Growth Pact led to the temporary 
suspension of the pact’s excessive deficit procedures last November by way of a narrow 
vote in the Council of Ministers. This gloom was accentuated by the EU’s failure to reach 
an agreement on the new Constitutional Treaty (in which the economic governance 
components had already been left dangerously weak) by the end of the Italian presidency 
in December. These less-than-ideal outcomes within the EU contributed at least indirectly 
to a deepening pessimism in the business and financial communities both in Europe and 
abroad. 
 
Then in January, the European Commission released its annual report on the progress 
achieved to date by the European economies in their pursuit of the mid-term objectives of 
the Lisbon Agenda, the EU economic programme agreed upon at Lisbon in 2000 which 
aims to make the EU the most dynamic and productive knowledge-based economy in the 
world by 2010. The EC’s progress report, slated to be at the centre of discussions at the 
Council meeting in Dublin this weekend, was sobering to say the least, revealing that 
Europe remained significantly behind its Lisbon targets. 
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Some encouraging signs have at least partially illuminated these darkening skies. Last 
fall, the German government made significant headway in laying the groundwork for the 
legislative approval of its economic reform programme, Agenda 2010, which aims to 
streamline the German welfare state and increase the flexibility of the highly rigid German 
economy. The success of the German reform programme would send a powerful signal to 
the world that leadership on reform efforts in the continent’s biggest economies was finally 
being exercised. In late February, Germany convoked a summit in Berlin of the “big three” 
(with France and the UK), ostensibly to debate the Lisbon reform agenda in anticipation of 
the Dublin Council and to breathe fresh air into the economic reform process. 
 
But the German reform process is not a done deal, and nor are the rest of the minimum 
reforms necessary to increase the long-run potential growth rate of the EU economy. 
Already Gerhard Schroeder, Germany’s SPD Chancellor, seems to be losing influence. 
After having been forced to relinquish leadership of the party by SPD strongmen, 
Schroeder watched on haplessly as the SPD badly lost the Hamburg elections, turning in 
their worst electoral performance there since WWII. Now even the Christian Democrats, 
the conservative opposition party, are showing increasing signs of withdrawing legislative 
support for Schroeder’s reform agenda (even though the CDU theoretically supports even 
more ambitious economic reforms). In any event, Schroeder appears to be willing to stake 
his entire political future and legacy on the success of the reform agenda. Having 
threatened to resign if a number of initial reform votes did not succeed, Schroeder 
continues to push his unpopular reform agenda even though his approval rating is no 
higher than 25%, lower than any previous German Chancellor and certainly far lower than 
Helmut Kohl was willing to see his popularity drop as a result of insisting on liberalizing 
economic reform. 
 
Admittedly, German progress on reform would exercise a most powerful demonstration 
effect for other reform laggards in the EU. Indeed, Germany must be at least the symbolic 
leader of economic reform and provide important political stimulus to the other EU 
members. Even Spain, a supposed leader of the Lisbon programme, and a country 
increasingly accustomed to being described as an economic star in Europe, lags badly 
behind on the Lisbon objectives, particularly in areas related to research and 
development, innovation, information technology, human capital development and 
education. After much rhetorical attention lavished on the Lisbon Agenda by the Aznar 
government (but with only a patchy record, at best, of real action), it remains to be seen 
whether the new social democratic government, surprisingly elected on March 14 in the 
wake of the Madrid bombings, will be able to improve upon the Popular Party’s reform 
record. At least the economic programme, designed for the election campaign by Miguel 
Sebastian, is consciously and meticulously trained upon the Lisbon objectives of 
enhancing productivity and bolstering the long-run potential growth rate. 
 
But while insufficient economic reform continues to undermine Europe’s potential growth, 
cyclical problems also plague the current economic environment. Although both Germany 
and France have continued to breach the Stability and Growth Pact’s 3% deficit limit, the 
additional fiscal stimulus that this has implied has not served to dramatically push these 
economies forward, as the controversy surrounding French and German fiscal policy has 
contributed to undermining business and consumer confidence, limiting the positive anti-
cyclical effect that higher deficit spending might have had. German growth was slightly 
negative in 2003, and the outlook for 2004 is only marginally better. Meanwhile, the 
recovery of German business confidence, which continued through much of 2003, has 
recently begun to falter, as the IFO economic sentiment surveys in the last months have 
begun to slip after several months of gains. At best, the higher deficits in France and 
Germany have simply served to keep Europe’s double-dip slowdown from collapsing into 
a full-blown continental recession. 
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The Euro 
Perhaps the issue which has caused the most apprehension in the press about the future 
of European recovery has been the appreciation of the euro. Since its cyclical low of 
US$0.82 in early November 2000 (more or less reached again during 2002), the euro has 
appreciated against the dollar by some 50% (swinging within the US$1.20-US$1.30 band 
now for several months). Concern has recently reached a near feverish pitch that euro 
appreciation could abort Europe’s sluggish recovery by undermining export growth, 
particularly in Europe’s biggest economies, Germany and France, where exports destined 
for non-Euro zone markets make up a larger part of GDP than in other Euro zone 
economies like Spain. This fear has led to numerous demands for looser macroeconomic 
policies. On the one hand, many in Europe are calling for the reform of the Stability and 
Growth Pact, arguing that it is too rigidly restrictive during cyclical downturns, and 
particularly given that many of the reforms called for in the Lisbon Agenda require 
significant increases in government spending on education, R&D, and other forms of 
public investment. On the other hand, forceful appeals are also emerging, insisting that 
the ECB should relax monetary policy to offset the contractional effect of the stronger 
euro. 
 
Regardless of the merits of the above arguments for looser macroeconomic policy in 
Europe, it certainly makes no economic sense, given the international context, to continue 
to target the stronger euro as the source of European economic malaise. Although a 
weaker currency, vis-a-vis one’s major trading partners, is always a potential source of 
short-term growth, via its effect on the GDP contribution from the external sector, it is not 
necessarily a firm foundation for a sustained cycle of growth. In the current scenario, a 
weaker euro might support the external sector’s contribution to European growth, but that 
is all it would do. A secondary effect of such a development would be further upward 
pressure on the US current account deficit which is already at record levels (both in 
absolute and relative terms) and has shown no signs of moderating even with the strong 
dollar depreciation against the euro. 
 
Indeed, there is generally a lag between the period of currency adjustment and the 
resulting current account adjustment; what is more, there is generally an initial worsening 
of the current account deficit (in the case of currency depreciation) due to a number of 
structural rigidities in import prices and contracts, which means that import volume is slow 
to react to depreciation, therefore creating a larger import bill at least until the full 
adjustment can take place (an effect known generally as the J-curve). Even in the case of 
the US, where the majority of foreign trade is contracted in dollars (partially sheltering the 
world’s largest economy and trader from rapid adjustment effects), a weakening dollar will 
not necessarily rapidly translate into lower imports, while exports will also typically face a 
delay before responding. This situation has been mirrored by continued export growth in 
Europe, particularly in Germany, during the recent period of currency adjustment. 
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If the euro were to fall once more against the dollar –before current accounts have been 
adjusted– the external imbalances would remain and even grow, making the dollar even 
more vulnerable to a potentially precipitous decline in the future. The long and the short of 
it is that knowing that an increasingly strong dollar, along with strong US domestic 
demand, served as the driving forces in the last cycle of world economic growth in the late 
1990s, a renewed period of world growth driven by the same factors will always be 
vulnerable to a reversal given the increasingly important constraint of the US current 
account deficit. The days of strong US domestic demand, coupled with weaker currencies 
abroad, as the key engines of growth are numbered, at least until the US’s current 
account deficit has been sufficiently reduced, and until the trading surpluses elsewhere 
are also eliminated. To return to the world growth pattern of the 1990s –with the US 
economy growing exclusively on the basis of internal demand and supported by a long 
cycle of dollar appreciation, and the rest of the world’s major economies in Europe, Asia 
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and the emerging world growing mainly on the basis of strong external demand provided 
by the US and supported by a cycle of currency depreciations– would no doubt prove to 
be short-lived. Furthermore, the inevitable outcome would be a return to a cycle of 
currency adjustment in which the dollar depreciated strongly against other major 
currencies, only this time around it would be more severe. The point is that this correction 
ultimately must occur. 
 
This means that before another sustained cycle of world growth can get underway, two 
important changes must take place in the US and European economies (Asia will be dealt 
with below). The US must engage in a sustained recovery based on growth from the 
external sector and a slowdown of domestic (particular consumer) demand, while Europe 
must grow on the basis of expanded domestic demand, accompanied by a correction of 
its current account surplus. Only when this combination of adjustments takes place –
allowing for an unwinding of US deficits and its consumer debt overhang, and 
accompanied by a revival of the reform impulse and domestic demand in Europe– will the 
world economy be on track for another period of sustained growth. 
 
In this scenario, there is no viable role for a weaker euro or a stronger dollar. Indeed, a 
stronger euro, while eventually contributing to a readjustment of Europe’s over-reliance on 
the external sector, will actually help stimulate domestic demand by increasing 
Europeans’ real purchasing power and possibly even increasing consumer confidence. 
Nevertheless, a stronger euro, while remaining a necessary ingredient for the revival of 
domestic demand, is not by itself sufficient. If a strong euro is not accompanied by a 
stimulus from domestic macroeconomic policy and by a serious effort to rationally 
liberalize the European economy, then it will contribute to further economic stagnation in 
Europe. In this respect at least, one of the debilitating knots cramping the world economy 
today is found in Europe. 
 
Nor is there a place for policies in the US designed to prop up domestic consumer 
demand. While the aggressive fiscal policy of the US during the last few years may have 
helped cushion the negative impact of the recession, there is now clearly no more 
convincing positive role for it to play. At most, fiscal policy stimulus should taper off to 
assure a gradual retrenchment of consumer spending and the accompanying draw-down 
of consumer debt. Paradoxically, had the US fiscal stimulus been designed differently, 
aiming the stimulus at those with the highest propensity to consume and/or those with the 
highest debt levels, it would have produced a greater stimulus effect, thereby creating a 
more likely possibility of faster job creation. At the very least, it would have allowed 
debtors to begin to lower debt levels earlier, allowing the subsequent consumer 
retrenchment to take place more gradually. Now the inevitable will only be harder and 
more painful to achieve. In the US –particularly in the realm of deficits and debt– we also 
find another important knot tying up the world economy. 
 
Asia 
Admittedly, Asia presents a piece which is difficult to easily fit into this puzzle. Formal and 
informal efforts in Asia to circumvent a decline in the dollar have contributed to increasing 
the pressure on both of these knots. In Japan, at least, the recent recovery offers the 
possibility that the yen will be allowed to gradually appreciate, after a long period of 
central bank intervention designed to avoid this from happening (and presumably to short-
circuit the perceived negative effects on the nascent, but still vulnerable, recovery). 
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In China, however, where growth remains very robust –and has even threatened the 
economy with overheating– the situation remains more problematic. Rapid growth is a 
political necessity for the Chinese regime, given the overriding need to continue to absorb 
the onslaught of rural-urban migration to the booming industrial zones in search of paid 
employment. Furthermore, the delicate situation in which the banking sector finds itself –
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dominated by four large state-owned banks with between US$400bn and US$800bn in 
bad loans– means that capital flow liberalization is, for the moment, not on the cards. A 
discrete revaluation (perhaps in the context of a new currency basket peg) might be 
considered, but it does not seem likely any time soon, considering the regime’s thirst for 
stability and the potential threat this revaluation might mean for growth. If China’s fixed 
exchange rate is maintained, on the other hand, its trade surplus with the US (constituting 
about 25% of the US’s US$500bn dollar current account deficit) is unlikely to subside any 
time soon, placing the burden of currency and current account adjustment on Europe. 
Thus, Chinese domestic dilemmas continue to place pressure on yet a third, Asian, knot 
in the world economy. 
 
Conclusions: Ideally, we would like to see all three knots (in the US, Europe and Asia) 
gradually loosened and undone. Unfortunately, each implies difficult domestic decisions 
which are politically problematic. In the US, this would require more fiscal discipline to 
take pressure off the current account and make the recovery more export dependent. In 
Europe this would mean more stimulus for domestic demand and further economic 
reform. In Asia, this would imply reform of the Chinese banking system and a stronger 
yuan and yen. 
 
Perhaps over the course of this year interceding events will make such changes more 
likely. A change of government in the US could bring about a significant change in fiscal 
policy. Nevertheless, much will depend upon the fate of the US strategic agenda and 
military spending under a Democratic president who is unlikely to enjoy a majority, at least 
in the House of Representatives. If the Republicans win the November elections, 
however, the only chance for US budget deficits to begin to subside will be rapid growth; 
but given the pattern of the current recovery, such growth will rely strongly on US 
domestic demand and continued upward pressure on the current account deficit –not 
exactly a sound recipe for sustaining this growth–. 
 
In Europe, the recent change in atmosphere in the EU that has come in the wake of the 
PSOE victory in Spain may lead to a more rapid agreement on the Constitutional Treaty. 
Such an agreement (possibly prepared for in Dublin this weekend) could also spill over 
into a more conciliatory environment in which the debates over the Stability Pact (due to 
be brought back onto the table for debate in April) could produce both the necessary 
reforms of the pact and the possibility of a more stimulating fiscal policy to support the 
recovery of domestic demand in Europe. The most optimistic scenario would also see this 
new positive atmosphere of cooperation feeding into a renewed impulse across the 
continent to make significant progress on the Lisbon Agenda. 
 
In Asia, continued Japanese recovery might lead to a less interventionist stance by the 
Bank of Japan in the currency markets, while continued progress in Chinese banking 
reform could build enough confidence for the Chinese authorities to begin to consider a 
change in currency policy. 
 
But none of this is guaranteed, making anything more than a cautious reading of the 
current signs of world recovery dangerously naive. Indeed, exogenous shocks could upset 
the apple cart altogether. Although one possible positive development would be a drop in 
oil prices this spring, this would be more than offset by another series of Islamic terrorist 
attacks in the US and Europe, particularly if the attacks were to take place in France or 
Germany, or if they occurred in the form of weapons of mass destruction (see ¿Qué 
significa el 11-M para la economía española, europea y mundial?, Paul Isbell, Real 
Instituto Elcano, ARI nº 52/2004, 23/3/2004). 
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Ultimately, Europe will have to take up its destiny as a central engine of world growth. 
Failure to do so is indeed the greatest single extant threat to the success of the European 
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project. Even if the project were to survive this failure, the EU would remain a toothless 
entity in the international system, hardly an appetizing scenario for those who see the EU 
as a model for the world. The message to European leaders could not be clearer. To wait 
for European growth to be restored by demand from the US or Asia is not only naive but 
dangerous. A strong euro is not an obstacle, but rather a welcome –if not the only or even 
the essential– tool for the task Europe faces today. 
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